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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 3963

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: INTIAL DRAFT OF "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON
MBFR"

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW FULL TEXT OF THE INITIAL INTERNATIONAL
STAFF DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON
MBFR"
WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS IN SENIOR POLADS ON
AUGUST 22 (SEPTEL). MISSION WILL SHORTLY PROVIDE ITS DETAILED
COMMENTS ON TEXT. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON TEXT
IN TIME FOR AUGUST 28 SENIOR POLADS MEETING.

2. BEGIN TEXT

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRESENT DOCUMENT CONTAINS FIVE SECTIONS
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ENTITLED

I. THE GUIDELINES

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

AND SETS OUT THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES.

2. THE GUIDELINES PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL DETERMINE ANY NEGOTIATING POSITION;
AND AGAINST WHICH ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL MEASURE ANY
SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. EITHER (THE ALLIED POSITION
DEFINES THE SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING APPROACH.
NEGOTIATING STRATEGY SUGGESTS THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ALLIED
POSITION TO BE PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE.)
OR (SECTION II SETS OUT THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION.
SECTION III SUGGESTS THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ALLIES MIGHT
PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS AND EXPLORE THE THINKING OF THE
OTHER SIDE.) (NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES) (SECTION IV) SETS
OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE ALLIES
PREFER. (INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION) (SECTION V) DEALS
WITH OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME AMONG ALLIES IN BRUSSELS AND IN
VIENNA.

3. THIS DOCUMENT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE INTERNAL
USE OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. SECTIONS III.B. AND IV MAY,
OF COURSE, BE PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE, AS APPROPRIATE.

I. SECRET GUIDELINES

(FINAL VERSION OF C-M(73)50(3RD REVISE)
YET TO BE ESTABLISHED.)

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II. THE ALLIED POSITION

INTRODUCTION

4. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS DESCRIBE EITHER (THE
POSITION FROM WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS EMBARK ON MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS. THIS POSITION COMPRISES THE OBJECTIVES WHICH
THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE TO SEEK, BUT DOES NOT REPRESENT
A RIGID DEFINITION OF THE SOLE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME. AN
ADJUSTMENT OF THIS POSITION, FOR INSTANCE IN RESPONSE
TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, WOULD
NECESSITATE A COLLECTIVE POLICY DECISION TO BE TAKEN BY
THE ALLIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION V OF THIS DOCUMENT.)

(US/BE) OR (THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION WHICH THE ALLIES COULD
ACCEPT AS THE OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF NO AGREEMENT
WITH THE OTHER SIDE CAN BE REACHED EXCEPT ON A LESS FAVOURABLE
BASIS THAN SET OUT BELOW, THE NECESSARY DECISIONS WOULD BE
TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION V OF THIS
DOCUMENT) (UK)

TERMINOLOGY

T. FORCES INVOLVED IN MBFR WILL BE DESCRIBED AND DEALT
WITH IN TERMS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE
HAND AND NON-US NATO AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES ON
THE OTHER, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS
FORCES.

6. PRINCIPLES(1)

6. THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREED DEFINITION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY" ON THE LINES OF THE
FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW(2). TO ENSURE THAT
THIS IS ACHIEVED BEFORE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS,
THE ALLIES SHOULD ACCEPT AN ORDER OF DISCUSSION WHICH ALLOWS
EACH SIDE TO ARRANGE FOR ITS OWN TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED IN
ORDER OF PRIORITY IN PARALLEL WITH THOSE OF THE OTHER.)

(1) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT THIS IDEA WOULD, IF AT
ALL, BE MORE APPROPRIATELY DISCUSSED UNDER SECTION III
(NEGOTIATING STRATEGY).

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(2) I.E. THE SECOND VERSION OF PARAGRAPH 8.

PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES

7. PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN
THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AIM AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE BY
REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS
MILITARY ACTIVITY. (CERTAIN MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT SHOULD
BE APPLIED TO FORCES RATHER THAN TERRITORIES AND CONFINED
TO US AND SOVIET FO

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REDUCTIONS

EITHER

(8. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON NATO
AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA
REACHED THROUGH A MAXIMUM 10 PCT REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS TO THE
RESULTING NATO FORCE LEVEL.) (US/BE)

(8. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN
GROUND FORCES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY
APPROPRIATELY DEFINED. THIS COULD BE DEFINED AS A COMMON
CEILING PROVIDED THAT:

(I) IT WAS NOT MADE PRECISE IN MANPOWER TERMS IN
A WAY THAT WOULD COMMIT US TO ANY SPECIFIC
COMMITMENT FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS;

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(II) SOME (MEASUREMENT) (MEASURE) OF COMBAT
CAPABILITY WERE (EXPLICITLY) ASSOCIATED WITH
THE IDEA;

(III) THE NEED FOR ASSOCIATED MEASURES TO OFFSET
THE WARSAW PACT'S MILITARY ADVANTAGES WERE
ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH IT.) (UK)

(8. BIS. UNDERLYING THIS CONCEPT THERE WOULD BE AN
INTERNAL ALLIED DECISION TO FIX A FLOOR BELOW WHICH ALLIED
REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT GO, BUT THIS FLOOR SHOULD NOT BE
MADE PUBLIC NOR COMMUNICATED TO THE OTHER SIDE. THE
DEFINITION OF SUCH A FLOOR MUST AWAIT DECISIONS BASED ON
THE EXPERT MILITARY JUDGEMENT OF SACEUR AND THE MILITARY
COMMITTEE.) (UK)

9. WITHDRAWAL (REPATRIATION) TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF

SOME US AND SOVIET FORCES, AS THE FIRST STEP TWOARDS THE OBJECTIVE DEFINED ABOVE (I.E. TOWARD AN OVERALL NATO/WP COMMON CEILING (OF 700,000 MEN, OR) OF ABOUT 90 PCT OF THE PRESENT LEVEL OF NATO FORCES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA.)

10. REDUCTIONS OF ALLIED COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE WHILE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE SECURED.

(11. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIETS SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY (5 DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT) AND THE US WOULD WITHDRAW AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER OF ITS STATIONED FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD MEAN REDUCTIONS OF 15 PCT ON BOTH SIDES, OR ABOUT 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS PLUS 1,700 TANKS AND ABOUT 29,000 US SOLDIERS.)
(US/BE)

OR

(11. IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS IN WARSAW PACT FORCES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SOVIET FORCES AND SHOULD AMOUNT TO, SAY, THE COMBAT CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT OF THREE SOVIET
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ARMoured DIVISIONS, AND SHOULD BE NO LESS THAN 10 PCT OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA. NATO REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A COMBAT CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT TO 2 US BRIGADES OF COMBAT TROOPS, AND SHOULD NOT EXCEED SOME 10 PCT OF US FORCES.) (UK)

12. THIS REDUCTION CONCEPT HAS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FEATURES:

EITHER

(I) (NATO SHOULD BE PERMITTED FLEXIBILITY IN THE FORM OF REDUCTION ON GROUNDS OF ASYMMETRY OF CONDITIONS. NATO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO PROTECT IMMEDIATE COMBAT CAPABILITY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.)

OR

(ON NATO'S SIDE, THE FORCES WITHDRAWN SHOULD BE THINNED OUT WHEREAS ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE FORCES ARE REDUCED BY MAJOR UNITS.) (BE)

(II) PROVISIONS CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF OTHER EQUIPMENT ON BOTH SIDES WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ASYMMETRIES WHICH PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO REINFORCE MORE RAPIDLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN THE US.

PLUS

(PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE STORAGE AND MAINTENANCE OF US HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE FACILITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN TO THE THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS.) (UK)

((III) PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN OR THE CARPATE AND ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICTS.) (BE)

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((IV) SOVIET WITHDRAWALS SHOULD INVOLVE DISBADMENT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE.) (UK)

STABILISING MEASURES TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS AND TO MAKE REDUCTION PROVISIONS EFFECTIVE

13. (SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE,) THE FOLLOWING STABILISING MEASURES, APPLICABLE TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, ARE ENVISAGED:

(I) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS ON FORCES INTO THE AREA;

(II) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA. (ANY REQUEST BY THE OTHER SIDE FOR SIMILAR CONSTRAINTS ON NON-US NATO FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS OR BEFORE WILL BE REJECTED);

(III) AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE (NEW OVERALL RELATIONSHIP IN THE) LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED

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VERIFICATION

15. VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP.

16. IN ADDITION TO AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHICH IS PERHAPS THE MOST ESSENTIAL PROVISION, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES SHOULD BE SOUGHT, SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE:

(I) FEWER RESTRICTIONS ON (NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES AND) MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS;

(II) OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY (NATIONAL ATTACHES AND/OR) SPECIAL GORUND OBSERVATION TEAMS CONSTITUTED FOR THIS PURPOSE;

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(III) SPECIAL MOBIL INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN THE POST-MBFR PERIOD;

(IV) LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBIL INSPECTION TEAMS.

(OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES, I.E. INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION, SHOULD BE APPLIED TO NON-SOVIET COUNTRIES WITHIN THE REDUCTION AND THE CONSTRAINTS AREA.) (BE)

(1) DELEGATIONS SUPPORTING THIS VIEW WISH TO APPEND TO THIS DOCUMENT THE RELEVANT STUDIES APPROVED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP.

PROVISIONS FOR REVIEW, AMENDMENT OR WITHDRAWAL FROM POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS

17. PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS

IN A SECOND PHASE

(18. DURING THE SECOND PHASE, WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED AND REFLECTED UPON WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THE WHOLE OF THE NON-US NATO FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE PROPORTION NEEDED TO BRING THE OVERALL REMAINDER - ALLOWING FOR THE REDUCTIONS ALREADY MADE IN US FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE - TO NO LESS THAN ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF ALL NATO FORCES IN THE MBFR AREA. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE WHOLE NSWP FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE NECESSARY PROPORTION TO ALLOW THE DESIRED COMMON GLOBAL CEILING TO BE ATTAINED. EACH ALLIANCE WOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED. REDUCED FORCES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA SHOULD BE INACTIVATED AND PUT IN RESERVE STATUS.) (BE)

EITHER

(19. AN INITIAL AGREEMENT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED AT THIS TIME OR ADVANCED TO THE SOVIETS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT IT SHOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL
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OF A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WP GROUND MANPOWER IN THE GUIDELINES AREA. SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE NON-US NATO FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE, BUT SUCH CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND DECIDED ON AT A LATER DATE.) (US)

PLUS

(THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN A PRECISE AND COMMITTING MANNER DURING NEGOTIATIONS OF THE FIRST PHASE.) (GE)

OR

19. AN INITIAL AGREEMENT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A LATER PHASE WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN NON-US NATO FORCES. THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE NEGOTIATED IN PARALLEL WITH REDUCTIONS IN US AND SOVIET FORCES, ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE REFERENCE TO THEM IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO DEFINE THE CONTENT OF A LATER PHASE BEFORE THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST PHASE, INCLUDING THE EFFICACY OF ATTENDANT CONSTRAINTS AND VERIFICATION MEASURES, HAVE BEEN ASSESSED.) (UK)

POST-REDUCTION CEILINGS

20. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE THE GLOBAL "COMMON CEILINGS" WOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE, WITH NO SUB-CEILINGS OTHER THAN THOSE RESPECTIVELY AFFECTING THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THAT GLOBAL CEILING.

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

21. THIS SECTION CONTAINS ALLIED THINKING ON THE STRATEGY AND THE GENERAL, AS OPPOSED TO THE DAY-TO-DAY, TACTICS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THEIR INITIAL PERIOD. IN PARTICULAR, IT DISCUSSES THE ALLIED OPENING PROPOSAL OR PRESENTATION AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS OF WHEN AND HOW IT SHOULD BE MADE.

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A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

22. THE FOLLOWING THINKING ON STRATEGY AND GENERAL TACTICS MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS REMAIN OPEN TO REVISION. DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER SIDE WILL ADD TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OBJECTIVES, MAY REVEAL SOME OF THEIR STRATEGY, AND COULD THEREFORE HAVE AN EFFECT UPON THE ATTITUDES TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES.

23. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL, IN FACT, BE QUITE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, SOME EXPERIENCES GAINED AT THE EXPLORATORY TALKS AND SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS COULD INDICATE A SOVIET INTEREST IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE SOVIETS WILL INDEED NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY FROM THE OUTSET OF THE TALKS, OR WHETHER THEY WILL STALL, AWAITING THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE AND/OR THE APPEARANCE OF RIFTS AMONG THE ALLIES.

24. THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SAY THE FIRST TWO OR THREE MONTHS, SHOULD BE USED TO INCREASE ALLIED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE AND MAY TAKE ON THE NATURE OF A DETAILED EXPLORATION OF SOVIET POSITIONS.

25. THERE MAY BE VARIOUS WAYS OF ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE, ALL OF WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO STIMULATE SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

ONE VIEW IS THAT, ONCE THE OPENING FORMALITIES HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ENTER WITHOUT DELAY INTO DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA, WORKING FOR AGREEMENT ON A FULL AGENDA INCLUDING ALL THE POINTS WHICH THE ALLIES WISH TO RAISE. IF OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON AN AGENDA, IT WOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF GETTING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION GOING. IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS COULD SUGGEST THAT

THERE SHOULD BE TWO LISTS OF TOPICS, ONE PRESENTED BY EACH SIDE, AND THAT ITEMS DRAWN FROM THE TWO SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN PARALLEL. THE AIM OF ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT ITEMS PROPOSED BY THE WEST ARE DISCUSSED AS THOROUGHLY

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AND AT AS EARLY A STAGE AS ITEMS PROPOSED BY THE EAST, AND THAT EACH ASPECT IS RELATED TO THE WHOLE AND NOT TREATED IN ISOLATION.

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FOR THE INITIAL PERIOD OF ALLIED OBJECTIVES WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENTLY MET BY A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION ON THE LINES INDICATED ABOVE.

DURING THIS INITIAL PHASE, THE ALLIES NEED NOT HAVE A CUT AND DRIED REDUCTION OPTION READY FOR TABLING.

A PARALLEL VIEW IS THAT THE INITIAL PERIOD COULD BE EMPLOYED FOR THE DISCUSSION OF

(I) THE ORGANISATION OF THE TALKS (RHYTHM OF MEETINGS; PLENARY MEETINGS; WORKING GROUPS; ROLE OF EMISSARIES);

(II) ELEMENTS OF THE VIENNA FINAL COMMUNIQUE (AGENDA; GROUND RULES OF MBFR; PHASED APPROACH; ASSOCIATED MEASURES);

(III) THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING;

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(IV) PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

A FURTHER VIEW IS THAT SERIOUS DISCUSSION WOULD BEST BE STIMULATED BY PRESENTING THE ALLIED POSITION IN OVERALL SKELETON OUTLINE RELATIVELY EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF OPENING STATEMENTS, THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIED POSITION AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS WOULD INITIALLY BE OUTLINED IN GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE TERMS. SINCE DISCUSSION AT THE VIENNA EXPLORATORY TALKS INDICATED THAT IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT THE EAST WOULD COME TO EARLY AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES, EARLY INTRODUCTION OF AN ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL ACCOMPLISHES WHAT AN ALLIED AGENDA PROPOSAL CAN ACCOMPLISH. A FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL HAS THE ADDED ADVANTAGE THAT IT WOULD ALLOW THE ALLIES TO INFLUENCE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE THE CONTENT AND DIRECTION OF NEGOTIATION. ONCE THIS BASIC FRAMEWORK HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD, EACH OF THE ELEMENTS COULD BE DEVELOPED IN DETAIL.

26. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED, AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH A DRAFT PROPOSAL WHICH THEY COULD TABLE AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION MAY REQUIRE. IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL REGARD THE ALLIES AS THE "INVITING PARTY" AND EXPECT THEM TO MAKE A PROPOSAL. IT MAY, FURTHERMORE, EVENTUALLY SEEM DESIRABLE TO PUT FORWARD AN ALLIED PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO PULL TOGETHER SPECIFIC ALLIED REQUIREMENTS ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE IN SYSTEMATIC WAY.

27. ANY ALLIED OPENING PROPOSAL SHOULD MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA. IT SHOULD BE

(I) SUPPORTED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS;

(II) STRONG, AND SO DESIGNED AS TO DRIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES;

(III) CREDIBLE AND DEFENDABLE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE, AS A SERIOUS PROPOSITION;

(IV) REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION;

(V) SUCH AS TO LEAVE AMPLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND REFINEMENT

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DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. THE OPENING PROPOSAL OR PRESENTATION(1)

(1) NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FOR A CONCRETE OPENING PROPOSAL
OR PRESENTATION HAS YET BEEN SUGGESTED.

28. ONE VIEW IS THAT THE ALLIES WOULD INITIALLY PRESENT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIED POSITION AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS IN BROAD TERMS. SUCCESSIVE ALLIED PRESENTATIONS OF THIS FRAMEWORK WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE INCREASINGLY GREATER DETAIL. THIS VIEW OPPOSES ADDITION OF "BARGAINING FAT" TO THE ALLIED POSITION. THE ALLIES' OPENING PROPOSAL SHOULD BE A REALISTIC INSTRUMENT FOR USE BOTH IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE EAST AND IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIED POSITION. UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE LONG SUSTAINED IN EITHER CONTEXT. IT IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE, THEREFORE, THAT THE ALLIES ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REALISTIC AND FIRM NEGOTIATING AIMS. GIVEN THE OVERALL CIRCUMSTANCES OF NEGOTIATIONS (NEED TO GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT, PROBLEM OF PRESS LEAKS, NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED, ETC.) THE ALLIES' MAIN RELIANCE IN PURSUING THESE AIMS WILL HAVE TO BE ON DETERMINATION AND PERSERVANCE RATHER THAN A STRATEGY OF SUDDEN TACTICAL SHIFTS ACCORDING TO A PRE-ARRANGED CONFIDENTIAL PLAN. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THIS VIEW OPPOSES THE CONCEPT THAT NATO SHOULD ADOPT A RANGE OF PROPOSALS AND TRY THEM OUT EXPERIMENTALLY WITH THE SOVIETS. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL NEED A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON ALLIED NEGOTIATING AIMS BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. TO LEAVE OPEN THIS QUESTION WOULD CAUSE CONTINUING DIVISIVE UNCERTAINTY AND CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE IN A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH AS MANY PARTICIPANTS AS THE PRESENT ONE TO FOLLOW A MORE TACTICAL APPROACH, ADVANCING SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES TO SOVIETS COULD CAUSE THEM TO DISCARD ONE AFTER THE OTHER, TO PRESS FOR FURTHER ALLIED FALBACKS, AND TO INCREASE THEIR DEMANDS.

29. OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE MADE VARIOUS SUGGESTINS
FOR AN OPENING PROPOSAL, SUCH AS

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Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
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Disposition Reason:
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Document Number: 1973NATO03963
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Document Unique ID: 00
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Line Count: 636
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 15 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15-Aug-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <21-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: INTIAL DRAFT OF "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR"
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005